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IS AUSTRALIA REALLY THE LUCKY COUNTRY? 
PRICE DISCRIMINATION IN 
DIGITAL DISTRIBUTION 
Alex Richardson, Research School of Business, School of Accounting and Business 
Information Systems, The Australian National University, Canberra, Australia, 
alex.richardson@anu.edu.au 
Abstract 
Digital content services have become a major source of information and entertainment for people, 
and the Internet has provided a means by which busines es and consumers can easily and efficiently 
distribute it. A large amount of this content is copyrighted or tied to a service, and sold commercially 
through multiple electronic and physical distribution channels. The modern day ‘gamer’ is expected 
to have a broadband connection and be able to access various digital distribution platforms to 
acquire such content. Due to price information disper ion and web resources dedicated to consumer 
awareness, differential pricing of PC game digital content delivery has recently become a 
controversial topic. This study collected and analysed price data across six geographical regions for 
over 1000 software titles in order to determine whether there was regional price discrimination. The 
results showed strong support for the price discrimination proposition. Future studies will focus on 
the causes and effects of such pricing and how pricing strategies can better manage the relationship 
between consumer and publisher. 
 
Keywords: digital distribution, e-commerce, region pricing, price discrimination, grey markets. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Digital information is an ever present part of modern life, with over 90% of information produced in a 
digital format (Varian 2005). Digital distribution services for personal computer games (e.g. Steam 
and Impulse) have become an attractive delivery option for the modern consumer with access to a 
broadband Internet connection. Multiple platforms from competing content providers have provided 
access to a global market and a need to choose suitable pricing strategies for a much more diversified 
customer base. 
The largest of these digital distribution platforms for PC games1 is believed to have about 70% of that 
market (Stardock 2009), with over 25 million active accounts spread over 237 countries in 21 
languages and had a growth of 25% in 2009. The number of online users is regularly around 2.5 
million concurrently, with an average of over 13 billion player minutes and 20 petabytes of data 
delivered per month. Unit sales in 2009 increased by more than 205%, the fifth year in a row that 
sales growth has exceeded 100%. The closest competitor believes they only have 10% of the PC 
games digital distribution market (remaining 20% consisting of multiple smaller platforms) and that 
the digital distribution accounts for about 25% of revenues "for a typical PC game publisher on a new 
title" (Stardock 2009). Considering the number of fixed broadband subscribers globally by the end of 
2009 was believed to be almost 500 million (ITU 2010), there is significant potential for further rapid 
market growth. 
Historically publishers and distributors have used economic models for pricing to set recommended 
retail prices within physical distribution channels and those prices will differ for reasons such as 
currency fluctuations and buying-power of each market segment. With the shift to digital distribution, 
those pricing decisions are causing friction with some consumers who enjoy the benefits of increased  
worldwide information and price transparency (Sinha 2000), coupled with a sense of entitlement to 
pay the same price (cēterīs paribus) for the digital content delivery of their ‘bits and bytes’ regardless 
of location (Huang et al. 2005). This concern is highlighted by a complaint-oriented message thread in 
the discussion forum of the distribution platform’s online store which contains in excess of 7,400 
posts submitted over (approx.) the last two years. The same issue with regional pricing but from a 
distributor and publisher perspective is identified in the Stardock (2009) report to customers. 
The purpose of this study is to determine whether te is price disparity across regions for a major 
digital content delivery service and if so, what direction are the pricing differences. Price data will be 
collected and analysed for four different regions (Europe, United Kingdom, United States of America 
and Australia). These four regions represent a large percentage of the broadband equipped ‘western’ 
PC game market (ITU 2010). The research question is as follows: 
 Does price discrimination exist in digital distribution of computer games? 
This study forms the basis for future research intoconsumer behaviour when faced with opportunity 
for fraudulent purchases (pretending to live in another country), how publishers or content delivery 
services manage inter-regional sales and what role DRM (digital rights management) will play. 
The paper proceeds by reviewing relevant literature and explanation of the methodology, followed by 
discussion of results, limitations and future research. 
2 RELATED LITERATURE 
The economics of price discrimination in physical distribution channels is well understood (Phlips 
1983; Varian 1989; Stole 2005). However with the advent of high-speed digital networks, the 
                                             
1 Care has been taken to not explicitly identify the digital distribution platform and online store investigated in this paper at 
this stage. If you wish to know further details, please contact the author. 
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opportunity for convenient digital distribution has negated some of the physical barriers preventing 
consumers from purchasing outside of their immediat market. This has flow-on effects on how 
consumers adapt to the new distribution environment how publishers and consumers influence each 
other. 
2.1 Digital delivery as a distribution channel 
Computer software for many years has followed a publishing model which paralleled that of printed 
books. This was a process where developers wrote the software and a publisher would acquire rights 
to the work for marketing and provision to distributors. These distributors would ship to retail outlets 
to be typically sold to consumers at or near the recommended retail price. Some early exemptions 
were smaller independent developers that handled many aspects of the process themselves and their 
ability to make perfect yet relatively inexpensive digital copies of their work enabled this.  
Software distribution models such as shareware further encouraged end-user distribution (sharing) of 
software. It has been found that sharing of information goods like software can increase profits 
(Varian 2000). Shareware provided a means for those new users to register or activate each copy via 
some complementary means in order to access full functionality or extend the usage period. The early 
days of shareware often relied upon physical distribu ion of media. With the increase in data 
communication speeds and Bulleting Board System popularity, digital delivery of some software 
became a reality for users who possessed dial-up mode s. Over time as Internet access become 
affordable and prevalent, this distribution concept migrated to the world-wide web (WWW) where 
small-scale software developers could advertise and offer their digital goods via a web presence. 
With the pervasiveness of broadband communication at affordable prices in many countries (ITU 
2010), publishers are increasingly moving towards digital distribution as a means of delivering 
content (Stardock 2009). Through content mirroring services hosted by ISPs and peering partners, 
consumers can access ‘local’ copies of content at higher speeds and reduced prices. With the initial 
digital distribution of content followed by digital access to subscription services, this also allows 
publishers to adopt a more profitable business model f selling to high-value and renting to low-value 
customers (Varian 2000). 
2.2 Market power and imperfect competition 
Market power is the ability for a market participant to influence the market price of a good or service. 
When a market is perfectly competitive, no participants in the market have market power. Therefore 
the software publisher is a price taker who by definition is not influential enough to affect the 
product’s pricing, but can still sell successfully sell at the current price to other market participants 
(i.e. the consumer). If the market competition is imperfect and the software publisher attains market 
power, they become a price maker and are able to manipulate the price and supply of the software 
product they sell. In such a situation, the consumer th n assumes the role of the price taker and may 
become subject to the firm increasing sales by reducing prices (Krugman & Obstfeld 1999). 
Ancarani (2002) proposed firms need to use smart and dy amic pricing to leverage the different value 
perceptions of customers. There is also automatic pricing, which is another method by which to 
maximise profits for sellers (Abe & Kamba 2000). Automatic pricing systems distinguish themselves 
from supply-and-demand dynamic pricing models by setting prices based on historical information. 
Abe and Kamba (2000) highlighted that consumers are increasingly influencing prices, not just the 
suppliers or manufacturers, due to consumer-to-consumer and ‘reverse bid’ auction sites.  
When considering print versus digital information resource pricing, Venkatesh and Chatterjee (2006) 
found the digital versions could enhance profits through price discrimination, and that there is a need 
to understand how to make the digital version more attractive with extra content and features. 
Koukova et al. (2008) found that using differential prices and informing customers of suitable usage 
were effective strategies. Implementations of this strategy can be seen though the recent adoption of 
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DLC (Downloadable Content) and digital editions that add extra features or content in popular game 
titles.  
2.3 Price Discrimination 
Price discrimination is well studied and a common practice across marks where there is a difference in 
economic demographics, with the “wealthy” regions being able to afford to pay a higher price for a 
product or service than “poorer” regions (Phlips 1983; Varian 1989; Stole 2005). It is seen as 
desirable as it can increase the efficiency of the economy, but causes strong opposition from informed 
buyers (Odlyzko 2003). By increasing regional segmentation of the market, manufacturers can sell at 
the optimal price and maximise profits while reducing consumer surplus (Ancarani 2002). 
Segmentation of markets however can (and often does) lead to the development of a “grey market” 
where consumers and resellers buy from a cheaper market by importing. In many markets, the 
government plays an important role in maintaining or c ntrolling price discrimination by imposing 
tariffs or import restrictions on certain items (Odlyzko 2003). Changes to copyright law which limit 
consumer rights have also been argued to increase the level of price discrimination. In particular, 
where the right to resell is removed (Meurer 1997). 
Duranceau (2003) discussed how digital content is often priced at perceived market value and not the 
cost of provision. This can also be seen in contexts where higher prices can be charged by a supplier 
because of some tangible non-digital attribute of the product is valued by the consumer (Lal & 
Sarvary 1999) or the service quality (Venkatesan et al. 2006). For physically distributed software, the
Internet provides a means for the quick and easy disemination and searching of price information. 
For digitally distributed software, the same applies and also the opportunity to offer immediate use (or 
as immediate as bandwidth allows). If the non-digital attributes no longer exist due to a purely digital 
process of searching, purchasing and acquiring, then traditional retailers are likely to become 
uncompetitive which may cause an increase in prices where a monopoly on digital sales exists. The 
pricing is important as Al-Rafee and Cronan (2006) identified that if a consumer has the cognitive 
belief that the price is unfairly high, they are more likely to have a higher attitude towards piracy. 
2.4 Electronic grey markets 
A “grey market” is an unofficial channel by which resellers or consumers can acquire goods without 
utilizing the official distributor(s) servicing that region. Physical goods acquired through unofficial 
channels may differ in packaging and level of end-user customer support (e.g. original region of sale 
determined from serial number and warranty limited o within that region). Regional governments 
(normally at the country level) will set import tariffs on items sourced from overseas and provided th 
cost of importation is not too high, grey market importers can sell the imported item at a discount 
within the region. Consumers who import directly from a different region do not have the bulk buying 
power of resellers. However, if the value of the imported goods is not above an import tax threshold, 
the only import costs incurred is the price of postage and currency conversion. The opportunity to 
acquire equivalent goods at a substantially reduced price is attractive to buyers. 
Digital delivery of software makes the establishment of a grey market relatively simple as the 
distribution method is normally consistent regardless of region (e.g. download installation client files 
from a website). The actual purchase consists of a license code or ‘CD-key’ that authorises the 
installation of the downloaded files and enables use of the software. This mechanism for activating 
use by a string of text makes it relatively simple for a buyer to be sent the activation key via email 
once payment has been provided. A reseller in a cheper region can purchase the keys locally and 
resell them to customers in more expensive regions t  activate their installations. The reseller makes a 
profit off the difference between purchase price and resale price, with close to zero overheads due to 
the entire process being electronic with little human labour involved. Such practice has been prevalent 
for many years, but recently it has gained media attention with a game publisher requesting a digital 
distribution platform ban keys for customers who owned grey market imports of a recent sales record 
breaking AAA title (Burnes 2009). 
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3 RESEARCH METHOD 
The public-domain content of an online store for a large digital delivery service provider (see footnote 
on 1st page) was ‘scraped’ for price information across the four main country regions that the provider 
services (EU, UK, US and AU). This catalogue exceeds 1000 game titles, with almost all being 
English language titles and many supporting multiple European languages. Some publishers choose to 
set different prices for countries within the EU and do not publicly announce which countries belong 
to which region. Therefore this study treats the EU region as being segregated into three tiers based 
upon store prices for Sweden, Norway and Lithuania for EU Tier 1, 2 and 3 respectively. These 3 
countries were identified as being representative based upon tier information derived from price data 
and store forum discussion, but are not classified by country-level economic indicators. Combined 
this gives a total of six price regions. The majority of prices are consistent across all three tiers, so 
Tier 1 can be treated as the EU price. 
Webpage mirroring software was used to capture the product price pages quickly and minimise the 
likelihood of price fluctuations due to promotional events, publisher initiated pricing adjustments and
other potential factors that may cause a title’s price in a particular region to change. This took 
approximately 15 minutes to download and then several hours to parse into comma delimited files. 
The data was then cleaned in preparation for statistical analysis. Any products that did not have data 
for all regions were manually checked to record whether this was a result of regional sale restrictions, 
invalid hyperlinks or unexplained redirections. The data collection process for 1038 software products 
resulted in price data for 1035, 1035, 1025, 1029, 1034 and 1002 products for the EU Tier 1, 2, 3, US,
UK and AU regions respectively. From this population f 1038, a sample of 987 products that had 
prices across all six regions was used for the infere tial analysis. 
The study is exploratory in nature, with descriptive and comparison of means being used to answer 
the research question, as well as identify topics of interest and potential issues for future study. 
Although the sample size is large and a normal distribution could be expected for prices, the data 
indicated a categorization effect with products being set at discrete price levels. This resulted in 
equivalent non-parametric Friedman, and Wilcoxon Signed Ranks tests for related samples being 
deemed to be more suitable techniques for data analysis. 
4 RESULTS 
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for each of the 6 regions being investigated in this study. The EU, 
US and UK regions had price data for about 99% of the software catalogue, with the AU region 
lagging behind on 97%. This larger discrepancy in the AU catalogue is due to 12 titles being unlisted 
in the AU store and a further 24 titles locked out d e to regional restrictions. The AU store uses USD. 
Table 2 presents the same information but limited to only titles that were common to all regions, with 
all prices converted to Australian dollars at the pr vailing interest rate on the day the data was 
collected ($1 AUD = ~€0.6375 EUR, ~£0.5527 GBP and ~$0.8838 USD).  
 
 
EU (Tier 1) 
(€ EUR) 
EU (Tier 2) 
(€ EUR) 








N 1035 1035 1025 1029 1034 1002 
Sum 18474.63 18210.43 17985.66 19104.46 13171.92 18818.73 
Mean 17.8499 17.5946 17.5470 18.5660 12.7388 18.7812 
Std. Deviation 13.74985 13.50593 13.55269 13.75588 9.18574 14.32318 
Minimum .65 .65 .65 .99 .59 .99 
Maximum 99.99 99.99 99.99 99.99 69.99 99.99 
Table 1.  Entire software catalogue descriptive stati ics (in local store currency) 
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 EU (Tier 1) ($ AUD) 
EU (Tier 2) 
($ AUD) 








N 987 987 987 987 987 987 
Sum 26844.85 26461.79 26548.06 20152.69 22273.68 20655.09 
Mean 27.1984 26.8102 26.8976 20.4167 22.5678 20.9257 
Std. Deviation 20.72483 20.44407 20.56948 14.71134 16.16416 15.87230 
Std. Error .65968 .65074 .65473 .46827 .51451 .50522 
Lower Bound 25.9038 25.5332 25.6128 19.4978 21.5582 19.9343 95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean Upper Bound 28.4929 28.0872 28.1824 21.3356 23.5775 21.9172 
Minimum 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.12 1.07 1.12 
Maximum 156.85 156.85 156.85 113.14 126.64 113.14 
Table 2.  Common software catalogue descriptive statistics (converted to $ AUD) 
The total cost for the entire catalogue of 1038 titles is $20861.94 AUD; with 601 of the titles being 
cheapest in the AU store (many of the AU titles have identical prices in the US store). The UK store 
also showed to have a strong influence on pricing, with 32.66% (339 titles worth $6221.65 AUD) 
being cheapest to purchase from that region. For the 987 titles in common across all regions, the total
cost is $19215.53 AUD. 
The results of the Friedman Test for detecting differences in prices across regions found a statistically 
significant difference between regions (at the p < 0.001 significance level). The US had the lowest 
mean rank (cheapest) at 2.14 and EU (Tier 1) had the highest (most expensive) at 4.70. The ranks for 
EU (Tier 2), EU (Tier 3), UK and AU were 4.56, 4.57 2.84 and 2.20 respectively. A Wilcoxon 
Signed Ranks Test was used to further explore the between region differences. All regions except 
“EU (Tier 3) - EU (Tier 2)” were statistically different from each other (at the p < 0.001 
significance level). The results of this analysis are shown in Table 3. 
 

















EU (Tier 2) - EU (Tier 1) 59 3 925 30.26 55.83 1785.50 167.50 -5.694a .000 
EU (Tier 3) - EU (Tier 1) 61 8 918 32.27 55.81 1968.50 446.50 -4.563a .000 
US - EU (Tier 1) 903 84 0 514.88 269.58 464933.00 22645.00 -24.722a .000 
UK - EU (Tier 1) 814 173 0 542.38 266.36 441498.00 46080.00 -22.077a .000 
AU - EU (Tier 1) 892 95 0 514.92 297.59 459307.00 28271.00 -24.093a .000 
EU (Tier 3) - EU (Tier 2) 2 5 980 3.00 4.40 6.00 22.00 -1.357b .175 
US - EU (Tier 2) 885 102 0 520.06 267.86 460256.00 27322.00 -24.195a .000 
UK - EU (Tier 2) 796 191 0 537.54 312.55 427880.00 59698.00 -20.555a .000 
AU - EU (Tier 2) 874 113 0 519.89 293.72 454388.00 33190.00 -23.538a .000 
US - EU (Tier 3) 887 100 0 519.55 267.38 460840.00 26738.00 -24.260a .000 
UK - EU (Tier 3) 796 191 0 537.64 312.14 427960.00 59618.00 -20.564a .000 
AU - EU (Tier 3) 877 110 0 520.55 282.33 456522.00 31056.00 -23.777a .000 
UK - US 355 632 0 323.55 589.74 114862.00 372716.00 -14.398b .000 
AU - US 10 30 947 15.30 22.23 153.00 667.00 -3.462b .001 
AU - UK 625 362 0 582.38 341.42 363985.00 123593.00 -13.423a .000 
a. Based on positive ranks.  b. Based on negative ranks. 
Table 3.  Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test statistics 
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5 DISCUSSION 
In response to the research question “Does price discrimination exist in digital distribution of 
computer games?”, the answer has been found to be yes. Table 3 shows that where the currency is 
identical across regions, the prices for the majority of titles are consistently the same, but still have 
significant differences. The results of the statistical analysis support the proposition that price 
discrimination exists between all but two of the regions. The lack of significant pricing difference 
between Tier 2 and Tier 3 of the EU region can be partly explained by the merging of Tier 3 into Tier 
2 for most, but not all software titles. 
By providing false location information or having a ‘friend’ purchase a title in another region and 
gifting it, an Australian-based customer of this digital distribution service can save $1439.56 AUD (a 
discount of almost 7%). With these savings come the risk that a publisher enforces region control and 
disables access to game. Both the US and AU store use the US dollar for the currency of payment, 
with 947 (96%) of the titles having the same price. This is beneficial to Australian customers as the 
online store prices are typically cheaper than the local Australian dollar RRP and comparable to the 
grey import versions of those physical titles. EU customers are less fortunate due to a tendency for 
titles to adopt a EU↔US pricing model of €1 EUR = $1 USD (581 titles exactly and 780 titles within 
+/- 10%). At the time of this study, €1 was equivalent to about $0.72c, a difference of about 39%. 
This causes a large discrepancy in prices, to the detriment of EU customers. 
The concerns of existing subscribers and future customers about differential pricing and a lack of 
transparency about why are justified. Forum discussion posts from one publisher said the digital 
distribution service recommended prices such as the $1USD=€1EUR, while the digital distribution 
service said the publishers decide price points for each region. Who the responsibility lies with is not
important provided customers are not turned away or unfairly punished for purchasing or acquiring 
content from outside their region. Regional pricing s rational from an economics perspective, but so 
is consumer behaviour that seeks to minimize the cost of digitally identical and legally acquired goods. 
6 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
This study used price data from the largest digital distribution platform for computer games and is 
likely indicative of the entire market, however this needs to be tested further. Due to publishers using 
multiple distributors, there are other much smaller minor providers of similar services who sell some 
of the same popular game titles. Future studies with an economics focus that control for factors like 
currency fluctuations and piracy propensity could reveal whether there is individual, flat or tiered 
pricing across distributors regardless of market share. Such studies could also discover whether 
publishers favour their own in-house content delivery platforms through lower pricing or other means. 
Some publishers on a per-title basis have shown intent to adopt DRM which requires persistent 
Internet connectivity for the software to authorise th  installation and permit any functionality, even if 
such connectivity would not otherwise a required feature (e.g. single player mode). Invasive DRM has 
met with high levels of resistance in the past and when the digital delivery content includes such 
mandatory DRM, customer dissatisfaction is likely to rise. How a content distribution platform can 
manage DRM without negatively impacting on sales and customer experiences is worthy of study. 
Neither Norway, Sweden or Lithuania use the € as their currency and therefore the inhabitants of 
those countries (and others where applicable) are likely to incur currency exchange fees for purchases, 
which further adds to the purchase cost. Norway has not accessioned to the EU but is a member of the 
European Economic Area and therefore able to access the European Union’s market. There are 
multiple discussion forum posts expressing dissatisfaction about large price discrepancies between the 
lower local store prices and the higher online price, which is at odds with what the digital publishing 
service touts as a reduced cost method of distribution. Whether this affects digital sales and 
potentially influences piracy rates needs further investigation. 
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During the process of this investigation, it was been noticed that there is relatively little per-title price 
adjustment over time. This indicates there is no automatic or dynamic pricing, but an actual 
longitudinal study is required to correctly determine this. There are however frequent sale periods (bi-
weekly) and promotional pricing (e.g. new releases). Information about the sales figures are not 
released, but at least one game oriented social networking site (gamerDNA 2009) that tracks what 
their subscribers play has shown large increases that coincide with discount and free-play periods, 
with differences between gaming platforms (e.g. PC vs console). Further study of this purchasing 
behaviour and manipulation of market power is warranted to see if there is potential for automatic 
pricing models, as identified by Abe and Kamba (2000) in other distribution channels. 
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